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According to Alisa Carrigan’s opinion in Physics
Today Dec 2007 [1], to prevent proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, certain rules should be set to pre-
vent the spread of a particular kind of knowledge.
Her argument goes as follows: To build nuclear
weapons, scientists and engineers of potentially
rogue countries need to know some technics which
could be learnt in nonmilitary peaceful activities,
for example in nuclear power plants. Therefore, to
prevent some countries access to nuclear weapon
knowledge, one should prevent their scientists and
engineers being trained in such facilities. As Carri-
gan says, knowledge proliferation is as important as
nuclear proliferation. To show this, Carrigan men-
tions the case of South Africa’s nuclear program—
some scientists and engineers having trained in
USA and Europe in non-military, peaceful, aca-
demic activities, obtained enough knowledge and
expertise to make their own nuclear weapons. Car-
rigan says that the cases of North Korea, India,
and Pakistan obtaining nuclear weapons, and Iran’s
progress in uranium enrichment are alike.
I would like to comment on this line of reasoning.
Logical consequences
First, nuclear weapons are not the only threats.
Chemical and biological weapons are as dangerous
as nuclear weapons. So if we accept this logic, the
restriction should not be limited to nuclear physics
and the related fields— by the same reasons, vari-
ous fields in chemistry, chemical engineering, phar-
maceutical and biological sciences, physics, and me-
chanics must be off-limits. After that comes various
fields of mathematics, for example number theory,
and software engineering; as they have applications
in cryptography. Just think of a terrorist attack by
some hacker to a computer that is controlling an
airlines corridor traffic. Even quantum computa-
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tion is also dangerous, because it has applications
in deciphering. Where should one stop?
Carrigan distinguishes between explicit and tacit
knowledge. But there is no permanent sharp line
between explicit and tacit knowledge. For exam-
ple, the need to use fabric gloves to assemble cen-
trifuges, the problem mentioned in Carrigan’s arti-
cle, now that it is being published, has been trans-
formed from tacit to explicit. Since people do have
access to explicit knowledge, through books and
journals, it is not sufficient to monitor the sources
of tacit knowledge—to prevent proliferation of the
required knowledge, it is necessary to control the
flow of explicit knowledge as well. This requires
establishing a system of censorship.
I think the logical consequence of accepting Car-
rigan’s idea is a kind of “Knowledge Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty”—a system to monitor and control the
flow of information through books, journals, inter-
net, participation in conferences, sabbaticals, etc.
Such a system, if implemented, simply means this:
Humans are divided into two categories, those hav-
ing the knowledge of making nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, and those that have not yet this
knowledge. The first category has the right and
must do its best to prevent the second category ob-
taining the required knowledge and technology. At
this limit, I think, it is nothing but a variant of
apartheid.
An inevitable conclusion in line with Carrigan’s
arguments would be that good people should con-
trol other people in the sense that if other peo-
ple were approaching dangerous knowledge (even
by themselves), good people should prevent them
even if necessary by force, even if necessary by get-
ting rid of the scientists of other people and destroy-
ing their scientific facilities, including their libraries
and equivalent digital resources. This, simply
would force people in the second category—those
who are forbidden to have the sacred knowledge—
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to invoke dirty tricks.
Scientific apartheid doesn’t work
I am not saying that scientific apartheid is bad,
for valuing something as good or bad could not be
judged scientifically. What is important, I think,
is that this scientific apartheid does not work, and
is not a suitable means to establish a sustainable
peace.
It does not work, because it is now almost im-
possible to impose it. Today, contrary to say 100
years ago, even people in developing countries do
have access to the basics of the scientific method
and the fundamentals of science. Once one knows
these, it is in principle possible to produce the for-
bidden knowledge. After all, this is what scientists
in the developed countries have done, and assum-
ing that there is no meaningful distinction between
the intelligence of people in different countries, if
people in say USA have been able to learn or con-
struct things by themselves, people in other coun-
tries can do that as well, though with some delay.
So a Knowledge Nonproliferation Treaty does not
help, since knowledge is not only transported, but
also produced—the example of fabric gloves men-
tioned in Carrigan’s article is a very good example
of this.
Reducing tensions
Now let us consider this problem from another
point of view. The case of South Africa’s nu-
clear program is worthy of discussing. Why South
Africa made weapons, and why finally destroyed its
weapons? I think the answer is that, 4 decades ago
South Africa was a country, having trouble with its
neighbors—and its own people as well. After the
Apartheid era, the troubles being solved, and now
South Africa does not need any nuclear weapons.
Which other countries have made nuclear weapons?
North Korea, having trouble with South Korea; Is-
rael, having trouble with all its neighbors; Pakistan,
having trouble with India; India, trouble with Pak-
istan. What Carrigan points, is that all these na-
tions were able to obtain the required knowledge,
and all of them from non-military activities. What
I conclude from this, is that if some nation has
enough motivation to build a dangerous weapon, it
probably can obtain the required knowledge—and
Carrigan says that this has always been achieved by
native scientists. Now, if we want to make a sus-
tainable peace, why not try to reduce the motivation
of nations to have weapons?
In mathematical terms
Let me formulate my view more mathematically.
Let K(T ) be the probability of nation X to have
the knowledge and technology required to produce
a nuclear weapon before time T . Let H(T ) be the
probability of nation X to have nuclear weapons
before time T . And let U(T ) be the probability of
nation X using nuclear weapons before time T . For
time T let’s consider 2020 for the moment.
One can argue that K is an increasing function
of the level of ease physicists from X can visit
foreign universities having nuclear physics depart-
ments. Denote this level of ease with x. One can
also argue that H , and especially U depend crit-
ically on the regional tensions—by region I mean
the Middle East, Kashmir, Korean Peninsula, etc.
Let y denote the level of this tensions.
The most important task is to try to reduce U ,
and after that H . Carrigan is saying that K is
an increasing function of x, even though so far all
those nations who had enough motivation, have
succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons. What I
am saying is that we know that decreasing y has
quite profound effects on reducing H and U , and
we know that in the only case for which the regional
tensions vanished, the country (South Africa) de-
stroyed its weapons. So why not trying to reduce
the regional tensions?
Besides, K(T ) is obviously an increasing func-
tion of time T , because it is an increasing function
of the overall level of knowledge and technology of
the world. Day by day it will become more and
more difficult to make K not approaching 1. How-
ever, forH(T ) and especially U(T ) it is not obvious
that they are increasing functions of time, for they
depend on the political conditions at times t ≤ T .
So again, it is quite wiser to try to reduce the re-
gional tensions.
Finally, trying to reduce the level of knowledge
of nation X , or preventing it from increasing its
knowledge, by establishing a type of Knowledge
Nonproliferation Treaty, will cause X to become
more aggressive and less developed. I think both of
these would increase H(T ) and U(T ).
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